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Abstract—Based on the concept of constructive interference
(CI), multiuser interference (MUI) has recently been shown to
be beneficial for communication secrecy. A few CI-based secure
precoding algorithms have been proposed that use both the chan-
nel state information (CSI) and knowledge of the instantaneous
transmit symbols. In this paper, we examine the CI-based secure
precoding problem with a focus on smart eavesdroppers that
exploit statistical information gleaned from the precoded data for
symbol detection. Moreover, the impact of correlation between
the main and eavesdropper channels is taken into account. We
first modify an existing CI-based preocding scheme to better
utilize the destructive impact of the interference. Then, we point
out the drawback of both the existing and the new modified
CI-based precoders when faced with a smart eavesdropper.
To address this deficiency, we provide a general principle for
precoder design and then give two specific design examples.
Finally, the scenario where the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable
is studied. Numerical results show that although our modified CI-
based precoder can achieve a better energy-secrecy trade-off than
the existing approach, both have a limited secrecy benefit. On
the contrary, the precoders developed using the new CI-design
principle can achieve a much improved trade-off and significantly
degrade the eavesdropper’s performance.
Index Terms—physical layer security, constructive interference,
secure precoding, symbol-level precoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiuser interference (MUI) is usually considered harmful
for downlink multiuser communication systems. The MUI
can greatly limit the achievable rate of each user especially
for a dense cellular network with many users. One common
approach to address MUI is multiuser precoding [1]–[5],
which typically employs a linear precoder at the transmitter to
suppress or completely remove the MUI at each user’s receiver.
Zero-forcing is a common technique to eliminate MUI [1], but
it can lead to noise amplification in certain scenarios. As an
alternative, signal-to-leakage-and-noise ratio can be chosen as
the design metric [2], which leads to a closed-form result.
For other approaches, the precoders are generally obtained by
solving one or two kinds of optimization problems: maximiz-
ing the sum rate under a total power constraint (e.g., [3]) or
minimizing transmit power under a quality of service (QoS)
requirement at each user (e.g., [4], [5]).
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Instead of suppressing MUI, recent research [6] suggests
that known interference can be exploited as a useful source
for improving the received signal power. According to [6], the
interference is regarded as constructive interference (CI) if it
contributes to a power enhancement of the desired symbol;
otherwise, it is destructive. By exploiting the information
about the symbols to be transmitted and the channel state,
the MUI can be designed in some cases to be constructive for
the desired users. Following this idea, an increasing number
of studies on CI-based precoding have been proposed [7]–
[11], where [7]–[9] focused on regular multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems, while [10], [11] considered massive
MIMO systems with low-resolution digital-to-analog con-
verters. These CI-based approaches can reduce the required
transmit power to achieve a certain level of performance,
especially when the system is heavily loaded. However, they
are mainly useful for simple constellation designs like phase-
shift keying (PSK), and they require symbol-level precoding,
which is more complex.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in improv-
ing the security of wireless communications systems. Physical
layer security (PLS) [12] is a technique that exploits the
randomness of wireless channels to achieve secure transmis-
sion. Through an appropriate design of the transmit signal,
PLS techniques can be used to minimize the power of the
eavesdropper’s received signal while guaranteeing a certain
detection performance at the desired user [13]–[16]. CI-based
precoding already benefits secrecy since it can achieve the
same performance for a given link with reduced transmit
power, which already reduces an eavesdropper’s ability to
decode the sensitive data. There has been some prior work
that employs a CI-based approach to improve communication
secrecy [17]–[19]. In [17], [18], CI-based secure precoding
algorithms were proposed to achieve energy-efficient secure
message transmission and secure simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer (SWIPT), respectively, assuming
single-antenna eavesdroppers. Specifically, with the channel
state information (CSI) available of all users’ channels, a
constructive-destructive (C-D) interference-based secure pre-
coding method1 was proposed, which exploits the MUI to
push the legitimate user’s received signal into the constructive
region for the desired symbol, and push the eavesdropper’s
noise-free received signal outside the constructive region.
The authors in [19] studied a related problem with a multi-
1This precoding method is referred to as C-D precoding algorithm in
the following paragraphs. The details of this precoder will be given in
Section III-A.
2antenna eavesdropper that can obtain a better estimate of the
transmitted symbol. Without the eavesdropper’s CSI, several
power-minimizing precoding algorithms were proposed.
Similar to [17], [18], in this paper we study a single-
antenna eavesdropper. We focus on the detection performance
at the eavesdropper rather than the secrecy rate, since CI-
based precoding assumes simple fixed signal constellations
such as PSK or quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM),
which is related to the prior work on secure transmission
with finite constellations [16]. It is important to note that
the eavesdropper in [17], [18] is assumed to adopt the same
detection method as the legitimate user. For that simple
detector, the detection rule is simply to choose the con-
stellation point nearest the received signal. For this simple
eavesdropper, the C-D precoding method in [17], [18] can
yield very good secrecy performance since the eavesdrop-
per’s received signal is designed to be far away from the
real transmitted symbol. However, if the eavesdropper can
exploit the statistical characteristics of the received signal,
a much better detection performance can be achieved. For
example, for PSK modulation, the eavesdropper can exploit
knowledge of the constellation used, the QoS parameters and
the channel distribution to obtain a (possibly empirical) model
for the conditional distribution of the received signal phase
θe given the transmitted symbols. This information can then
in turn be used to enable the eavesdropper to implement an
optimal maximum likelihood (ML) detector. In this paper, an
eavesdropper that can learn and implement this ML detector
is referred to as a smart eavesdropper in this paper. When
faced with a smart eavesdropper, the C-D precoding algorithm
may unexpectedly reveal the transmitted symbols. since the
restriction on the location of the eavesdropper’s received signal
makes the distribution of θe non-uniform on [0, 2π], which
helps the eavesdropper distinguish different symbols.
To address the above issue, in this paper we restudy
CI-based secure precoding from the perspective of a smart
eavesdropper. Furthermore, we consider a general scenario
where the eavesdropper channel is possibly correlated with
the main channel, which makes it easier for the eavesdropper
to observe the desired symbol. We first review the C-D
precoding algorithm in [17], [18]. It is observed that although
the eavesdropper’s noise-free received signal is kept outside
the constructive region, the scheme in [17], [18] only exploits
a part of the destructive region, which significantly increases
the transmit power. Inspired by this observation, we propose
our own C-D precoding algorithm, which exploits the full
destructive region and thus can save power. Then, we point
out the drawback of the above C-D precoding strategies in the
presence of a smart eavesdropper. To overcome the drawback,
we propose another secure precoding method, which only
limits the power of the eavesdropper’s received signal without
any constraints on the phase. Following this, a low-complexity
secure precoding algorithm is also proposed. Finally, we
study a more practical scenario where the eavesdropper’s CSI
is unavailable. The primary contributions of the paper are
enumerated below.
1) We show that the C-D approach of [17], [18] only ex-
ploits a portion of the destructive region when designing
the precoder.
2) We present a modification of the C-D approach of [17],
[18] that exploits the full destructive region, and that is
thus able to achieve the same level of security with less
transmit power.
3) We show that, for PSK signals, the C-D precoding
approach is susceptible to a smart eavesdropper that can
derive the conditional distribution of the phase given the
transmitted signals.
4) We present a new design principle for secure CI-based
precoding that addresses this deficiency, and we propose
two algorithms based on this principle to generate the
precoder. While these new approaches will require an
increase in transmit power compared with C-D precod-
ing, they can achieve significantly improved security that
approaches the best possible performance.
5) Unlike the methods above which assume availability
of the eavesdropper’s CSI, we develop an alternative
algorithm that uses artificial noise (AN) for the case
where the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives the system model and the basic idea for constructive in-
terference. Section III first reviews the existing C-D precoding
algorithm and then presents an improved version of the C-D
precoding algorithm. After introducing the smart eavesdrop-
ping approach, the security risk of the C-D precoding methods
is revealed. Section IV gives a general principle for designing
the precoder against a smart eavesdropper. Then, two specific
precoding algorithms are provided. Section V studies the sce-
nario where the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable. Section VI
presents numerical results to evaluate the performance of all
the precoding schemes, and finally Section VII concludes the
paper.
Notations: In this paper, bold upper-case letters denote
matrices while bold lower-case letters denote vectors. The set
of M × N complex matrices is denoted as CM×N . For a
vector x, xT , xH , and ‖x‖ represent the transpose, Hermitian
transpose, and l2 norm of x, respectively. For a scalar x,
|x| and x∗ represent the l2 norm and complex conjugate of
x, respectively. I denotes the identity matrix while 1N×1
represents an N × 1 vector composed of all ones. Finally,
CN (µ,Ω) denotes the complex circular Gaussian distribution
with mean µ and covariance Ω.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Description
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we concentrate on downlink trans-
mission in a single-cell multiuser system. The base station
(BS), equipped with N antennas, simultaneously serves K
single-antenna users using the same time-frequency resource.
Apart from the users being served, there also exist idle users
who do not have permission to access the transmitted informa-
tion but may try to overhear it. These idle users are potential
eavesdroppers. In this paper, we consider a simple but typical
scenario where a single eavesdropper is located near one of
the users (labeled as user 1) to try to wiretap the confidential
message for this user. The other users are assumed to be
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Fig. 1. System model: A downlink multiuser communication network with
an eavesdropper attempting to get user 1’s message.
ordinary users without a secure communication requirement.
Like the K users, the eavesdropper is also equipped with a
single antenna.
At the BS, each element of the symbol vector s =
[s1, . . . , sK ]
T , where sk is the desired symbol for user k,
is drawn from a normalized M-PSK constellation set CM =
{cm : m = 1, · · · ,M} given by
cm = exp (j(2m− 1)Φ) , (1)
where Φ = pi
M
. In addition, we assume that the BS has perfect
CSI of the legitimate channel H = [h1, · · · ,hK ]T , where
hk ∈ CN×1 denotes the channel from the BS to user k. As
for the eavesdropper channel he ∈ CN×1, we first assume that
full knowledge of he is available. The case where information
about he is unavailable will be studied in Section V. The BS
designs the transmit signal vector x = P (s,H,he) ∈ CN×1
based on the symbol vector and CSI, where the function P{·}
represents a general symbol-wise precoder which can be linear
or non-linear.
The received signal at user k can be expressed as
yk = h
T
k x+ nk, (2)
where nk ∼ CN (0, 1) is additive white Gaussian noise at the
receiver. For ease of notation, we assume that all the nodes
have the same noise power, which is normalized to be 1. In
addition, we only consider flat fading channels and assume
that hk ∈ CN (0, βkI), where βk models large-scale fading
such as geometric attenuation and shadowing. Similarly, the
received signal at the eavesdropper is given by
ye = h
T
e x+ ne, (3)
where he ∈ CN (0, βeI) with βe denoting the large-scale
fading parameter and ne ∼ CN (0, 1). Since the eavesdropper
is located very close to user 1, the two channels h1 and he
are in general correlated. Using the channel correlation model
in [20], [21], the eavesdropper channel can be written as
he =
√
βe
(√
ρh˜1 +
√
1− ρw
)
, (4)
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the constructive interference design for 8PSK
modulation. The solid circle sk is the symbol of interest while the hollow
circle is the adjacent constellation point.
where h˜1 = h1/
√
β1 is the normalized version of h1 with
respect to the large-scale fading parameter, and w ∈ CN (0, I)
is a random vector independent of h˜1. The parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1]
measures the strength of the channel correlation. Note that
since the eavesdropper is close to user 1, it will usually be
true that βe = β1.
The existing research in [17], [18] assumes that the eaves-
dropper adopts the same detection method as the legitimate
users, which greatly limits the eavesdropper’s capability. In
this paper, we consider a smart eavesdropper that can use
statistical information to improve detection performance. The
details will be given in Section III-B.
B. Constructive Interference
Constructive interference-based precoding transforms the
undesirable MUI into useful power to push the received signal
further away from the M-PSK decision boundaries, which in
turn reduces the symbol error rate at the end user. To show
the concept of constructive interference more clearly, we give
an intuitive example in Fig. 2, where the symbol of interest sk
is assumed to be one of the constellation points of the 8PSK
constellation. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the constructive region
for sk is the green sector with infinite radius and angle 2Φ,
and the decision region for sk is the sector determined by the
two dashed red rays which are also referred to as decision
boundaries. The distance between the constructive region and
the decision boundary depends on τ0, which is also related to
the minimum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) requirement. When
the noise-free received signal zk = yk − nk lies in the
constructive region, it is pushed deeper into the decision region
and thus is more robust to additive noise perturbations. With
knowledge of the CSI and the symbols to be transmitted, CI-
based precoding guarantees that the noise-free signal received
at each user lies in the constructive region of each user’s
desired symbol. In this way, the MUI is transformed into useful
energy for improving the SNR.
4III. TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTIVE-DESTRUCTIVE
INTERFERENCE BASED SECURE PRECODING
In this section, we first review the traditional C-D precoding
algorithm in [17], [18] with eavesdropper’s CSI. The idea of
C-D precoding and the corresponding algorithm are described.
Then, a smart eavesdropper, who can exploit statistical infor-
mation for symbol detection, is introduced. Finally, we point
out the drawback of C-D precoding when faced with a smart
eavesdropper.
A. Precoding Task and Solution
As discussed in Section II-B, it is beneficial for the le-
gitimate users if their noise-free received signals are located
in the constructive regions of the desired symbols. On the
other hand, the noise-free received signal at the eavesdropper
should be located outside the constructive region, which will
make a correct detection at the eavesdropper more challeng-
ing. Accordingly, the C-D precoding method of [17], [18]
pushes the received signal at each legitimate user towards
the corresponding constructive region, while guaranteeing that
the noise-free received signal at the eavesdropper lies in the
destructive region (the red area in Fig. 3(a)). As in [17],
[18], different SNR requirements are assumed for the users
and eavesdropper; in particular, it is assumed that the desired
minimum SNR is γ0 for all users, and the desired maximum
SNR is γe for the eavesdropper. Generally, γe is chosen to
be much smaller than γ0 to make the eavesdropper suffer a
higher symbol error rate. Since the noise power is assumed to
be one, for the parameters τ0 and τe in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we
have τ0 =
√
γ0 and τe =
√
γe.
Now, we formulate the optimization problem that the C-D
precoding approach of [17], [18] attempts to solve. First of
all, in order to find a uniform expression for the constructive
regions of different symbols in the constellation, we rotate
the original coordinate system by the phase of the symbol
of interest. Taking the symbol sk as an example, the new
coordinate system after rotation is shown by the gray one in
both Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Based on (2), in the new coordinate
system, the real and imaginary part of the noise-free received
signal zk can be respectively derived as
Re{zk} = Re
{
(yk − nk)s∗k
|sk|
}
= Re{gTk x} (5)
and
Im{zk} = Im
{
(yk − nk)s∗k
|sk|
}
= Im{gTk x}, (6)
where we adopt the new variable gk , hks
∗
k and use the fact
that |sk| = 1. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the constructive region
for sk can be defined by the following inequality
|Im{zk}| ≤ (Re{zk} − τ0) tanΦ, (7)
which already indicates that Re{zk} ≥ τ0.
For convenience, we rewrite the constraint in (7) using real-
valued notation. In particular, we define the following real-
valued vectors
aTk =
[
Re{gTk },−Im{gTk }
]
, (8)
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Fig. 3. The constructive-destructive interference based secure precoding for
8PSK modulation. (a) Our proposed scheme (b) The scheme in [17], [18].
bTk =
[
Im{gTk },Re{gTk }
]
, (9)
x¯T =
[
Re{xT }, Im{xT }] . (10)
It can be easily verified that
Re{zk} = aTk x¯, Im{zk} = bTk x¯. (11)
Therefore, the real-valued reformulation of (7) can be written
as ∣∣bTk x¯∣∣ ≤ (aTk x¯− τ0) tanΦ, (12)
which is equivalent to the following two constraints(
aTk tanΦ− bTk
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, (13a)(
aTk tanΦ + b
T
k
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0. (13b)
According to the C-D precoding in [17], [18] (e.g., refer
to problem (25) in [17]), the location of the eavesdropper’s
noise-free received signal ze = h
T
e x is constrained by
− Im{ze} ≤ (Re{ze} − τe) tanΦ, (14a)
Im{ze} ≥ (Re{ze} − τe) tanΦ, (14b)
where Re{ze} and Im{ze} are the real and imaginary part
of ze in the new coordinate system rotated by the phase of
5sk. Since only user 1 has a demand for secure communi-
cation, sk can be specified as s1 when rotating the original
coordinate system. Thus, defining ge , hes
∗
1 and introduc-
ing the real-valued vectors aTe =
[
Re{gTe },−Im{gTe }
]
and
bTe =
[
Im{gTe },Re{gTe }
]
, we have
Re{ze} = aTe x¯, Im{ze} = bTe x¯. (15)
Then, the inequalities in (14) can be rewritten as
− bTe x¯ ≤
(
aTe x¯− τe
)
tanΦ, (16a)
bTe x¯ ≥
(
aTe x¯− τe
)
tanΦ. (16b)
The goal of the C-D precoding in [17] is to achieve the
above constructive-destructive interference constraints for the
legitimate users and the eavesdropper, while minimizing the
transmit power. Thus, the optimization problem for the C-D
precoding in [17] is given by
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (17a)
s.t.:
(
aTk tanΦ− bTk
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k (17b)(
aTk tanΦ + b
T
k
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k (17c)
− bTe x¯ ≤
(
aTe x¯− τe
)
tanΦ, (17d)
bTe x¯ ≥
(
aTe x¯− τe
)
tanΦ. (17e)
Constraints (17b) and (17c) ensure that the noise-free received
signal at each user lies in the constructive region of the
transmitted symbol for that user. Constraints (17d) and (17e)
force the noise-free received signal at the eavesdropper to
be located outside the constructive region of s1. However, it
should be noticed that constraints (17d) and (17e) correspond
to a fraction of the destructive interference region, as shown by
the red area in Fig. 3(b). The full destructive region is depicted
in red in Fig. 3(a). The transmit power required to solve the
optimization in (17a)-(17e) will thus in general be higher than
what would be required if the full destructive region were
exploited in formulating the constraints in (17d) and (17e).
To achieve a lower transmit power, in the first algorithm we
present, we derive a modification to the C-D precoding algo-
rithm that exploits the full destructive region. As illustrated in
Fig. 3(a), the entire destructive region can be described by the
following inequality
|Im{ze}| ≥ (Re{ze} − τe) tanΦ, (18)
which is however not convex. The inequality in (18) holds
when any one of the following three constraints is satisfied
Re{ze} − τe ≤ 0, (19a)
Im{ze} ≥ (Re{ze} − τe) tanΦ and Re{ze} − τe > 0,
(19b)
− Im{ze} ≥ (Re{ze} − τe) tanΦ and Re{ze} − τe > 0.
(19c)
The constraints in (19) can also be reformulated as a set of
simultaneous inequalities using the big-M method [22], which
requires the introduction of binary auxiliary variables and
thus involves high-complexity mixed-integer programming.
Therefore, for the one-eavesdropper case considered in this
paper, we propose to directly use the three constraints in (19).
The real-valued reformulation of (19) is given by
aTe x¯− τe ≤ 0, (20a)(
aTe tanΦ− bTe
)
x¯− τe tanΦ ≤ 0 and aTe x¯− τe > 0,
(20b)(
aTe tanΦ + b
T
e
)
x¯− τe tanΦ ≤ 0 and aTe x¯− τe > 0.
(20c)
Based on (20), our C-D precoding algorithm can be formu-
lated as
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (21a)
s.t.: (17b) and (17c) (21b)
(20a) or (20b) or (20c). (21c)
Note that problem (21) actually involves three different convex
problems, each of which can be readily solved using standard
convex optimization solvers. After each subproblem of (21)
is solved, the solution with the minimum transmit power is
selected as the final C-D precoder. In the following analysis,
we will focus on our modified C-D precoder to illustrate
the security risk of this type of approach when faced with a
smart eavesdropper. A performance comparison between our
C-D precoder and the C-D precoder in [17] will be given in
Section VI.
B. Security Risk When Facing Smart Eavesdropper
In the above discussions, the eavesdropper is assumed to
adopt the same detection method as the legitimate users,
namely performing symbol detection based solely on the
instantaneous observed signal. However, if the eavesdropper
can exploit statistical information about the received signal, the
symbol detection capability can be significantly increased. One
way to obtain statistical information is learning from publicly
available training data used for channel estimation. On the
other hand, when the eavesdropper knows the statistical distri-
bution of all wireless channels, SNR parameters γ0 and γe, and
the adopted constellation, she can simulate the transmission
by solving problem (21) for different realizations of the
wireless channels and symbols. For example, by using either of
the above two approaches, the eavesdropper can empirically
determine the probability distribution of the received signal
conditioned on each symbol cm ∈ CM . Note that for PSK
modulation, it is sufficient to focus only on the phase of
the received signal, which is denoted as θe. We denote the
conditional PDF of θe given symbol cm as f(θe|cm). With
empirically derived estimates of these PDFs, the eavesdropper
can employ the ML criterion for symbol detection. For the
ML detector, when the eavesdropper receives a new signal
with phase θe,0, the detection result is given by
c∗m = argmax
cm
f(θe,0|cm). (22)
Note that the ML detector in (22) not only utilizes the instan-
taneous information θe,0 but also the statistical information
about the distribution of the phase. We refer to an eavesdropper
using this ML detector as a smart eavesdropper.
To study the performance of C-D precoding in the presence
of a smart eavesdropper, we examine empirically estimated
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Fig. 4. QPSK modulation with channel correlation coefficient ρ = 0.3
and γ0 = 10 dB: Empirical conditional PDF f(θe|c1) for different SNR
requirements at the eavesdropper. (a) γe = 15 dB (b) γe = 0 dB (c) γe =
−15 dB.
distributions f(θe|c1) for a few scenarios2. In Fig. 4 we show
f(θe|c1) for QPSK modulation in a polar coordinate system
where the polar angle from 0° to 360° covers the range of
values for θe and the radius represents probability density.
The results are obtained by averaging over both the transmit
symbol vector s where user 1’s desired symbol is fixed as c1,
and all wireless channels with βk = 1 (k = 1, · · · ,K) and
βe = 1.
First, as illustrated in Fig. 4(a), when γe is very large
2Considering that symbol cm is a rotated version of c1 by angle (m −
1) 360°
M
, the empirical conditional PDF f(θe|cm) which has been averaged
over the transmitted symbols for other users and all wireless channels is also
a rotated version of f(θe|c1) by the same angle. Therefore, the empirical
conditional PDFs for other symbols have characteristics similar to f(θe|c1).
which leads to nearly no constraint on the eavesdropper’s
received signal, there is a considerable probability that the
eavesdropper’s received signal lies in the decision region of
c1 (i.e., quadrant I). As such, the eavesdropper has a relatively
high probability of detecting the transmitted symbol, and thus
it is important to adopt security-aware precoding when channel
correlation exists. As γe becomes smaller, we can see that the
C-D algorithm produces a distribution for f(θe|c1) with two
narrow lobes3. Compared with Fig. 4(b), the lobes in Fig. 4(c)
are pushed closer to the boundaries of the destructive region of
c1, i.e., the two dotted black rays in Fig. 3(a). This is because
compared with pushing ze deeper into the destructive region,
pushing ze near the boundaries can save power in most cases,
which is consistent with the objective of problem (21). As a
result, the probability that the eavesdropper’s received signal
falls in quadrant I is reduced, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b) and
Fig. 4(c). This is beneficial for communication secrecy if the
eavesdropper adopts the same simple detector as the legitimate
user.
However, the rotational asymmetry of f(θe|c1) when γe
is small can be exploited by the eavesdropper to improve
her detection probability. The distributions for different cm
will be identical to those shown in Fig. 4, except rotated by
±90◦ and 180◦ for the case of QPSK. The lobes for adjacent
symbols will overlap, and the correct detection probability
for the eavesdropper can approach 50% for equally probable
symbols, twice the minimum of 25% achieved by random
guessing. Thus, whether γe is large or small, the security
of the C-D precoding scheme is compromised. This means
that the security of the system may not improve even as the
transmit power increases or even if the desired user’s channel
is much stronger than that of the eavesdropper. Clearly, a better
approach for a smart eavesdropper employing optimal ML
detection would be to ensure that the distribution for different
f(θe|cm) are as identical and rotationally invariant as possible.
This is the theme of the technique proposed in the next section.
IV. SECURE PRECODING AGAINST SMART EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we first discuss a general principle for
designing secure precoding against smart eavesdroppers.
Then, we present a specific precoding algorithm based on
information-carrying signal suppressing (ICSS), which can
overcome the drawback of the C-D precoding scheme. A
fast ICSS precoding algorithm is also provided, which uses
the gradient projection method for improving computational
efficiency.
A. Design Principle
We know that for M-PSK modulation, the eavesdropper’s
minimum correct detection probability is 1/M , which is the
probability achieved by a random guess. To make random
guessing the optimal strategy for a smart eavesdropper, the
conditional PDFs for different symbols should be identical.
Furthermore, since the conditional PDFs for other symbols are
3As shown later in Fig. 6, if the original approach of [17] were used,
the lobe would be along only one of the symbol boundaries rather than
symmetrically on both of them.
7rotated versions of f(θe|c1), the ideal f(θe|c1) which makes
the transmitted symbol totally indistinguishable from other
symbols should be rotationally symmetric for every angle of
360°/M , as mentioned in Section III-B. Therefore, to mitigate
smart eavesdropping, the focus of secure precoding is not on
the instantaneous performance but on making the received
symbols statistically indistinguishable.
B. ICSS Precoding
Based on the above discussion, secure precoding against
a smart eavesdropper should aim at making the conditional
PDFs for different symbols identical, which can be specified
as making the conditional PDF rotationally symmetric in
a polar coordinate system. The simplest type of rotational
symmetry would be to make the conditional PDFs uniform in
all directions, i,e, where the phase θe is uniformly distributed
on [0, 2π]. However, even for this special case it is still
challenging to design a specific precoding algorithm that can
realize the desired statistical distribution.
It is worth noting that eavesdropper’s received signal con-
sists of two parts, the information-carrying signal ze which
is also the aforementioned noise-free received signal, and
the additive Gaussian noise ne whose phase is uniformly
distributed on [0, 2π]. If the information-carrying signal can
be hidden in the additive noise, the ML detector at the
eavesdropper will be useless. This can be achieved by simply
transmitting in the null space of the eavesdropper channel.
However, this will consume a lot of power especially when
the eavesdropper channel is highly correlated with the main
channel. To show the trade-off between consumed power and
secrecy, we consider a more general and flexible approach
which limits the power of the information-carrying signal, as
illustrated in Fig. 5(a). Following the previous notation, for a
given SNR constraint γe, the power of ze is limited as
|ze|2 ≤ τ2e , (23)
where τe =
√
γe. For the complex variable ze we have
|ze|2 = (Re{ze})2 + (Im{ze})2. Therefore, the real-valued
reformulation of (23) is given by
x¯T
(
aea
T
e + beb
T
e
)
x¯ ≤ τ2e . (24)
Based on (24), our proposed ICSS precoding approach can
be stated as
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (25a)
s.t.:
(
aTk tanΦ− bTk
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k (25b)(
aTk tanΦ + b
T
k
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k (25c)
x¯TAx¯ ≤ τ2e , (25d)
where A = aea
T
e +beb
T
e . Constraints (25b) and (25c) ensure
that the constructive region requirement is met at each desired
user while constraint (25d) limits the maximum power of
the eavesdropper’s noise-free received signal. Problem (25) is
convex and can be solved using standard algorithms.
Note that although ze is referred to as the information-
carrying signal, it can be any point on the complex plane,
rather than one of the fixed constellation points. By placing a
ze
¿e


sk
(a)
ze
¿e


sk
(b)
Fig. 5. Secure precoding against smart eavesdropper, where τe =
√
γe: (a)
ICSS precoding (b) Fast ICSS precoding.
constraint on the power of ze, we actually limit the contribu-
tion that ze makes to the final received signal. As the power
of ze decreases, the information about the real transmitted
symbol is more likely to be hidden. Therefore, the achievable
secrecy level of our ICSS precoding approach will continue
improving as γe decreases, which overcomes the drawback of
C-D precoding where secrecy performance can not be further
improved as γe is reduced.
C. Fast ICSS Precoding
In the last subsection, we proposed an ICSS precoding al-
gorithm that improves communication security by suppressing
the power of the information-carrying signal at the eavesdrop-
per. However, the power constraint in (25d) leads to a quadrat-
ically constrained quadratic program [23], the computational
complexity of which is relatively high. To further reduce the
computational complexity, we change the power constraint
in (25d) to the power constraint illustrated in Fig. 5(b). By
requiring ze to be located in a square with diagonal length
2τe, the maximum power of ze is τ
2
e . The advantage of
this approach is that the maximum power constraint can be
expressed using linear rather than quadratic constraints:
−
√
2τe/2 ≤ Re{ze} ≤
√
2τe/2, (26a)
−
√
2τe/2 ≤ Im{ze} ≤
√
2τe/2. (26b)
8Based on the real-valued expression (15), the fast ICSS
precoding algorithm can thus be formulated as
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (27a)
s.t.: Qx¯− b  0, (27b)
where
Q =


−aTk tanΦ + bTk−aTk tanΦ− bTk
aTe
−aTe
bTe
−bTe


(2K+4)×2N
,
b =
[−τ0 tanΦ12K×1√
2
2 τe14×1
]
(2K+4)×1
. (28)
To solve problem (27), we first derive the following La-
grange dual function of (27)
L(x¯,λ) = x¯T x¯+ λT (Qx¯− b) , (29)
where λ  0 is the (2K+4)×1 Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (27b). According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions [23], the optimal solution to problem (27)
is achieved at ∂L
∂x¯
= 0. The root of ∂L
∂x¯
= 0 is given by
x¯∗ = −1
2
QTλ. (30)
Then, we need to find the optimal λ, which is the solution to
the dual problem given by
max
λ0
g(λ), (31)
where
g(λ) = inf L(x¯,λ)
(a)
= −1
4
λTQQTλ− λTb (32)
is the dual function, and (a) is obtained by plugging (30) into
(29).
Due to the non-negative constraint λ  0, it is difficult to
derive a closed-form solution to (31). Therefore, we use the
gradient projection method to find the solution. Since we aim
at maximizing the concave function g(λ), the current value
λn is updated as
λn+1 = max {λn + tn▽g(λn),0} , (33)
where tn is the positive step size used at the nth iteration, and
▽g(λ) = − 12QQTλ−b is the gradient of g(λ). The function
max {λ,0} is the projection of λ onto the solution space λ 
0 in (31). For calculating the step size tn in each iteration, we
employ the backtracking line search algorithm [23], [24]. The
details are shown in Algorithm 1, where the parameters t, δ,
and µ are set according to [24]. With the updated step size,
we can use the gradient projection method to solve problem
(31) and then problem (27). The entire iterative algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 2.
Now, we compare the computational complexity of the ICSS
precoding and the fast ICSS precoding algorithms. For ICSS
precoding, problem (25) can be reformulated as a semidefinite
programming problem with linear matrix inequality (LMI)
Algorithm 1 Backtracking line search algorithm.
Input:Q, b, λn, t = 1, δ = 0.1, µ = 0.5;
1: while 1 do
2: λn+1 = max {λn + t ∗ ▽g(λn),0};
3: if g(λn+1) ≥ g(λn) + δ · ▽g(λn)T (λn+1 −λn) then
4: Break;
5: end if
6: t = µt;
7: end while
8: tn = t;
Output: tn
Algorithm 2 Iterative algorithm for solving problem (27).
Input:Q, b, initial λ0  0, n = −1, ǫ;
1: repeat
2: n = n+ 1;
3: Calculate step size tn using Algorithm 1;
4: λn+1 = max {λn + tn▽g(λn),0};
5: until g(λn+1) − g(λn) ≤ ǫ or maximum number of
iterations reached
6: Obtain the optimal Lagrange multiplier, i.e., λ∗ = λn+1;
Output: x¯∗ = − 12QTλ∗
constraints, which can be solved using the interior-point
method (IPM). According to [25], the computational complex-
ity in each iteration of IPM is O (N4). On the other hand, as
discussed in [24], the dominant complexity of Algorithm 2
is calculating the gradient ▽g(λ) in each iteration, which
requires O (KN) computations. Therefore, the fast ICSS
precoding algorithm is significantly less complicated.
V. SECURE PRECODING WITHOUT EAVESDROPPER’S CSI
In this section, we consider the scenario where the eaves-
dropper’s CSI is unavailable4. Without the eavesdropper’s CSI,
we cannot control the location of ze and thus we cannot control
the distribution of the eavesdropper’s received signal. On the
other hand, due to the channel correlation, it is very likely that
the eavesdropper’s received signal is aligned with or near the
symbol of interest, which makes the symbol easily detected.
Recalling the channel correlation model in (4), the noise-free
received signal at the eavesdropper can be decomposed as
ze = h
T
e x =
√
βe/β1
√
ρhT1 x︸ ︷︷ ︸
symbol of interest
+
√
βe(1− ρ)wTx︸ ︷︷ ︸
random term
. (34)
The first term in (34) represents the desired symbol for user
1, since hT1 x is designed to lie in the constructive region
of s1. The second term in (34) is unknown and random,
changing every transmission due to different x. Since the
value of w is unknown, the random term wTx can be either
constructive or destructive to the instantaneous detection of s1.
This term randomizes the statistical distribution of θe and thus
can degrade the detection performance of the eavesdropper.
4The scenario without eavesdropper’s CSI is also studied in [17] but only for
the case of a single legitimate user. Moreover, the effect of channel correlation
is not considered in [17].
9Therefore, the second term in (34) acts as a type of AN as
in [13], [26] which helps hide the transmitted information.
To be hidden in the AN term, the power of hT1 x in (34)
should be as small as possible. However, the constraint in
(7) requires that z1 = h
T
1 x be located in the constructive
region of s1. It is obvious that the power-minimizing point in
a constructive region is the intersection of the two constructive
region boundaries. Consequently, we have Re{z1} = τ0 and
Im{z1} = 0, which is equivalent to
aT1 x¯ = τ0, b
T
1 x¯ = 0. (35)
In addition, the power of wTx should be large enough
to guarantee sufficient randomization to the phase of the
eavesdropper’s received signal. With unknown w, we place
a constraint on the power of x instead, since the average
power of wTx can be approximated as Ew
{|wTx|2} ≈
Tr
(
xHEw
{
w∗wT
}
x
)
= ‖x‖2 = ‖x¯‖2.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following
approach to be used when CSI for the potential eavesdropper
is absent:
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (36a)
s.t.: aT1 x¯ = τ0, b
T
1 x¯ = 0, (36b)(
aTk tanΦ− bTk
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k 6= 1 (36c)(
aTk tanΦ + b
T
k
)
x¯− τ0 tanΦ ≥ 0, ∀k 6= 1 (36d)
‖x¯‖2 ≥ P0, (36e)
where P0 determines the minimum average power of the AN.
Without constraint (36e), problem (36) only focuses on mini-
mizing ‖x¯‖2, which may lead to small AN values. Constraint
(36c) and (36d) are the constructive region requirements for
the other users.
Constraint (36e) leads to a non-convex feasible set, which
makes problem (36) difficult to solve. To tackle this prob-
lem, we adopt the sequential convex programming (SCP)
method [27], [28], which iteratively approximates the original
non-convex set by an inner convex one in each iteration.
Specifically, in the nth iteration we approximate function
f(x¯) , ‖x¯‖2 using its first-order Taylor expansion f˜(x¯, x¯n)
at the current point x¯n. The expression for f˜(x¯, x¯n) is given
by
f˜(x¯, x¯n) = f(x¯n) +▽f(x¯n)T (x¯− x¯n)
= ‖x¯n‖2 + 2x¯Tn (x¯− x¯n) , (37)
where ▽f(x¯) is the gradient of f(x¯) with respect to x¯. The
constraint (36e) can now be replaced with
f˜(x¯, x¯n) ≥ P0. (38)
With (38), we can obtain the following convex optimization
problem in the nth iteration
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (39a)
s.t.: (36b)− (36d), (38). (39b)
Problem (39) can be readily solved using standard convex
optimization solvers or the gradient projection method in
Section IV-C.
Algorithm 3 SCP method for solving problem (36).
Input: initial point x¯0, n = 0, ǫ;
1: repeat
2: Calculate function (37) based on x¯n;
3: Solve problem (39) and assign the optimal solution to
x¯n+1;
4: n = n+ 1;
5: until ‖x¯n−1‖2 − ‖x¯n‖2 ≤ ǫ or maximum number of
iterations reached
Output: x¯n
As shown in [28], the SCP method results in an objective
function that is non-increasing at every iteration, so this
approach will always converge to a local optimum of problem
(36). We summarize the entire SCP method in Algorithm 3.
To guarantee that the generated solution in each iteration is
feasible for the original non-convex problem (36), we need
to start from a point x¯0 which belongs to the feasible set
of problem (36). To find x¯0, we use the iterative feasibility
search algorithm (IFSA) proposed in [28], which iteratively
minimizes the violation parameter until convergence.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performance of the above
precoding algorithms through simulation. Unless otherwise
stated, we set N = 6, K = 3, βk = 1 (k = 1, · · · ,K),
βe = 1, and γ0 = 10 dB. The eavesdropper in the simulation
below adopts the detection method in (22). To simulate the
performance of the eavesdropper, we first generate random
transmit symbols and wireless channels to obtain the empirical
conditional PDF f(θe|cm). Then, the empirical decision region
for each constellation point cm can be obtained, which is the
region where f(θe|cm) is larger than f(θe|cn) for any n 6= m.
Based on the decision region, the detection probability for
the eavesdropper can then be obtained. The transmit power
in the results below is also averaged over different transmit
symbols and wireless channels. In the following simulations,
we first consider the scenario where the eavesdropper’s CSI
is available. Then, the scenario without eavesdropper’s CSI is
studied.
Similar to Fig. 4, we first depict the empirical conditional
PDF f(θe|c1) for the C-D precoding algorithm in [17], where
QPSK modulation is adopted with channel correlation param-
eter ρ = 0.3, a desired SNR of γ0 = 10 dB. Unlike Fig. 4,
we can see that there is only one lobe in Fig. 6, since the C-D
precoding in [17] requires Im{ze} ≥ 0, which only exploits
the upper part of the entire destructive region. Moreover, when
γe is larger than γ0, e.g., γe = 15 dB in Fig. 6(a), there is still
a significant lobe which makes the transmitted symbol easily
detected. This is because the feasible region shown by the
red zone in Fig. 3(b) shrinks as γe increases. Thus, the phase
distribution of ze is still concentrated rather than dispersed.
In Fig. 7, we compare the algorithms discussed in the paper
in terms of consumed power and secrecy. First, we concentrate
on the comparison between the two C-D precoding strategies.
From Fig. 7(a) we can see that the C-D precoding in [17]
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Fig. 6. The C-D precoding algorithm in [17] with QPSK modulation:
Empirical conditional PDF f(θe|c1) for different SNR requirements at the
eavesdropper. (a) γe = 15 dB (b) γe = 0 dB (c) γe = −15 dB.
consumes more power than our C-D precoding algorithm. This
is expected since the scheme in [17] only exploits a part of
the destructive region, which leads to a stricter optimization.
In addition, it is worth noting that the power consumed by our
C-D precoding algorithm decreases as γe increases, while the
power of the scheme in [17] first decreases and then increases.
This is because the feasible set for our approach keeps getting
larger as γe increases. However, for the algorithm in [17], too
large a γe will unnecessarily require the imaginary part of ze to
be large, which consumes significant power5. For the secrecy
performance in Fig. 7(b), our C-D precoding also outperforms
5Typically, γe is chosen to be smaller than γ0 to degrade the eavesdropper’s
performance. Here we consider a wider range of γe to thoroughly study the
effect of γe on the performance of each precoding algorithm.
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Fig. 7. Performance comparison among different precoding algorithms for
QPSK modulation with ρ = 0.3. (a) Transmit power versus SNR constraint
(b) Eavesdropper’s correct detection probability versus SNR constraint.
the C-D precoding in [17]. This corresponds to the result in
Fig. 6 that a single lobe makes the transmitted symbol more
easily detected.
Next, we compare the performance of the two C-D precod-
ing algorithms and the two ICSS algorithms. Fig. 7(b) shows
that our improved C-D precoding strategy provides signifi-
cantly lower detection probability than the algorithm of [17],
which achieves a probability of slightly less than 0.5 for small
γe. On the other hand, the ICSS and fast ICSS schemes
can further reduce the eavesdropper’s detection probability
to about 0.25, which corresponds to the perfect secrecy case
where the eavesdropper’s optimal strategy is random guessing.
However, as shown by Fig. 7(a), the consumed power of the
two ICSS algorithms for γe < 5 dB is higher than that of the
two C-D precoding schemes, particularly our C-D precoding
algorithm. Therefore, there is a trade-off between secrecy and
power, which will be discussed later in Fig. 8.
Now we focus on the extreme case for the ICSS precoding
algorithm where γe = −30 dB. In this case, the information-
carrying signal ze at the eavesdropper is nearly zero, which
11
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN ICSS PRECODING (γe = −30 dB) AND THE
TRADITIONAL ZF PRECODING.
Algorithm
N = 6, K = 3 N = 4, K = 3
Power (dB) PEve
dec
SERk Power (dB) P
Eve
dec
SERk
ICSS 12.06 0.26 1.4× 10−3 22.34 0.26 1.4× 10−3
ZF 12.34 0.25 1.5× 10−3 27.50 0.25 1.5× 10−3
Eve’s Correct Detection Probability
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Fig. 8. Power-secrecy trade-off curve for QPSK modulation with channel
correlation coefficient ρ = 0.3.
corresponds to the traditional zero-forcing (ZF) scheme where
both the MUI and the eavesdropper’s received signal are
forced to be zero. Table I makes a comparison between the
ICSS precoding algorithm (γe = −30 dB) and the traditional
ZF algorithm for QPSK modulation with ρ = 0.3, where
PEvedec denotes the eavesdropper’s detection probability, and
SERk is the symbol error rate averaged over K legitimate
users. From Table I one can see that the two algorithms
achieve similar detection performance at the legitimate users
and the eavesdropper, but ICSS precoding requires less power
especially when the system is heavily loaded (e.g., a 5dB
power savings for the case of N = 4, K = 3). Unlike the
ZF method whose consumed power is fixed and high, the
ICSS algorithm can adjust its transmit power according to
the secrecy requirement. Even for the scenario with a high
secrecy requirement, ICSS precoding can use much less power
to achieve secrecy performance similar to the ZF method,
especially for a heavily loaded system.
Fig. 8 depicts the power-secrecy trade-off curves for the
two C-D precoding algorithms and the two ICSS algorithms,
which are generated by changing the SNR constraint γe at
the eavesdropper. First, it can be observed that the C-D
precoding in [17] has the worst performance, since all the
other schemes use less power but achieve a lower detection
probability at the eavesdropper. In addition, our C-D precoding
algorithm is the most energy efficient when the eavesdropper’s
detection probability is higher than 0.4. However, it is worth
noting that this scheme as well as the scheme in [17] cannot
further degrade eavesdropper’s performance, which indicates
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Fig. 9. Power-secrecy trade-off curve for a highly correlated scenario with
ρ = 0.7. (a) QPSK modelation (b) 8PSK modulation.
that there is a secrecy bottleneck for the C-D precoding
algorithms. Further increases in the transmit power for our C-
D precoding algorithm enhance the eavesdropper’s detection
probability. Therefore, the two ICSS precoding schemes are
vital for eliminating the secrecy bottleneck of the C-D precod-
ing algorithm. It is also worth noting that for the simulation
scenario in Fig. 8, the fast ICSS precoding is more energy
efficient than ICSS precoding. Recalling Fig. 7 which has the
same simulation settings, it is observed that for a fixed γe,
although the fast ICSS scheme consumes more power than the
ICSS algorithm, it can significantly reduce the eavesdropper’s
12
detection probability. Consequently, fast ICSS precoding has
a better trade-off curve than ICSS precoding. One possible
reason is that compared with using a circle to limit the location
of ze, using a square which has a side perpendicular to the line
on which the desired symbol is located can more effectively
reduce the probability that the eavesdropper’s received signal
is aligned with or near the desired symbol.
In Fig. 9, we study the trade-off between power and secrecy
in an environment with higher channel correlation. Comparing
Fig. 9(a) and Fig. 8, we can see that to achieve the same
secrecy level, more power is needed for the scenario with
ρ = 0.7. Moreover, when the correlation parameter rises from
0.3 to 0.7, the lowest detection probability for the eavesdropper
that the two C-D precoding schemes can achieve is increased.
On the contrary, the lowest probability that the two ICSS
precoding algorithms can achieve remains unchanged, as long
as there is enough power. Therefore, ICSS precoding is
more robust to the strength of the channel correlation. We
also study the case of 8PSK modulation in Fig. 9(b). It is
observed that the two ICSS precoding algorithms can reduce
the eavesdropper’s detection probability to about 0.125, which
corresponds to random guessing for 8PSK.
Finally, we investigate the scenario where the eavesdrop-
per’s CSI is unavailable. In Fig. 10, besides the scheme pro-
posed in Section V, which is labeled “Without CSI”, we also
reintroduce the aforementioned CSI-dependent algorithms as
baselines. Another baseline scheme, referred to as “Traditional
CI”, is also introduced. The Traditional CI scheme aims at
solving optimization problem (17) without constraints (17d)
and (17e). Thus, it only focuses on the legitimate users’ com-
munication reliability without taking secrecy into considera-
tion. First of all, we can observe that the secrecy performance
of the C-D precoding in [17] is even worse than the Traditional
CI scheme, which indicates that an inappropriate design of the
security-aware precoder will expose the transmitted symbol
to the smart eavesdropper. Moreover, except for the C-D
precoding in [17], the other three CSI-dependent methods tend
to converge to the Traditional CI method as the transmit power
decreases. For the algorithm that does not use eavesdropper’s
CSI, the minimum required power is always larger than that of
the Traditional CI approach. This is because additional power
is needed to satisfy constraint (36b), which in turn helps reduce
the eavesdropper’s detection probability. One can also observe
that for the Without CSI scheme, enhancing transmit power is
always beneficial for improving the secrecy. However, due to
the absence of eavesdropper’s CSI, more power is generally
needed to achieve the same secrecy level as the two ICSS
algorithms. One exception is when the eavesdropper’s correct
detection probability is larger than 0.5, where the Without CSI
scheme is more energy-efficient than at least one of the two
ICSS algorithms.
Fig. 11 shows the secrecy performance of the Without
CSI approach versus the channel correlation parameter for
different P0. From Fig. 11 we can see that the eavesdrop-
per’s detection probability increases as ρ increases, which is
expected according to (34). Not only is the eavesdropper’s
received signal is more likely to be concentrated at the symbol
of interest as ρ increases, the power of the random term
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Fig. 10. Performance comparison between the schemes with and without
eavesdropper’s CSI for QPSK modulation, where ρ = 0.3.
Channel correlation parameter ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
E
ve
’s
C
or
re
ct
D
et
ec
ti
on
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
P0 = 20 dB
P0 = 30 dB
P0 = 40 dB
Fig. 11. Secure precoding without eavesdropper’s CSI: Eavesdropper’s
correct detection probability versus channel correlation parameter for different
P0.
in (34), which acts as noise for blocking the eavesdropper,
reduces as ρ increases. Meanwhile, one can also observe that
improving P0 is beneficial for reducing the eavesdropper’s
detection probability, which is consistent with the result in
Fig. 10 that the eavesdropper’s detection probability decreases
monotonically with an increases in the transmit power for the
Without CSI algorithm.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we restudied the CI-based secure precoding
problem. Unlike the existing research, we considered a smart
eavesdropper who can utilize statistical information for ML
symbol detection. We first modified the existing CI-based
precoding algorithm for a better utilization of the destructive
interference. Then, we pointed out the security risk that both
the original and our modified precoders have when faced with
a smart eavesdropper. To combat the smart eavesdropper, a
general principle for designing security-aware precoders was
given. Two specific precoding algorithms were then provided.
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In addition, the scenario without eavesdropper’s CSI was
also studied. Finally, we used numerical results to show the
importance of the proposed schemes for mitigating a smart
eavesdropper.
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